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OF THE LAND. 
The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland precluded an oc-
cupier of commercial land from 
recovering damages from a pri-
or occupier for alleged contam-
ination of the property by toxic 
chemicals under strict liability, 
negligence, trespass, and nui-
sance causes of action. 
Rosenblatt v. Exxon, 335 Md. 
58,642 A.2d 180 (1994). In so 
ruling, the court insulated pre-
vious occupiers of land from 
liability for the damage they in-
flict to the land by severely lim-
iting subsequent occupiers' 
methods of recovery. 
Thomas Rosenblatt 
leased a parcel of real property 
with plans to open an automo-
tive quick lubrication business 
on the premises. Prior to 
Rosenblatt's occupancy, the 
Exxon company had leased the 
land for thirty-four years for use 
as a gasoline station. Before 
building his business, Rosenblatt 
had an environmental test ad-
ministered which detected ex-
tensive petroleum contamina-
tion in both the soil and ground-
water. Accordingly, the Mary-
land Department of the Envi-
ronment was notified. Upon 
conducting its own investiga-
tion the Department informed 
Exxon that it had violated Mary-
land law, at which time Exxon 
commenced a remediation of 
the property. As a result of the 
condition of the property, 
Rosenblatt lost financing for his 
business and was unable to com-
mence construction. 
Rosenblatt filed suit 
against Exxon in the Circuit 
Court for Prince George's 
County, alleging counts of strict 
liability, negligence, trespass, 
and private nuisance. The com-
plaint sought economic damag-
es, including expenses resulting 
from the contamination and lost 
future profits. Exxon removed 
the suit to the United States 
District Court for the District of 
Maryland, which granted Exxon 
partial summary judgment on 
grounds not here at issue. The 
court remanded the remaining 
counts to the circuit court. The 
trial court granted Exxon's 
motion for summary judgment, 
stating that Maryland law did 
not provide protection to ten-
ants of commercial property 
against previous tenants of the 
same land under the causes of 
action Rosenblatt set forth. 
Rosenblatt appealed to the court 
of special appeals, at which time 
the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land granted certiorari prior to 
review by the intermediate ap-
pellate court. 
The court of appeals 
began its analysis by rejecting 
Rosenblatt's argument that the 
strict liability doctrine should be 
extended to claims of subse-
quent occupiers. Maryland 
adopted section 519 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts 
(1965), which requires that there 
be harm to a person or property 
of another resulting from an 
abnormally dangerous activity. 
Rosenblatt, 335 Md. 58,69-70, 
642 A.2d 180, 185. Since its 
adoption, however, the court 
has protected strict liability from 
judicial expansion. Specifical-
ly, the court has declined to 
extend the doctrine in situations 
where the alleged tortfeasorwas 
not the owner or occupier of 
land. Id. at 71,642 A.2d at 186 
(citing Toy v. Atlantic Gulf & 
Pacific Co., 176 Md. 197,213, 
4 A.2d 757 (1939)). Similarly, 
the doctrine has been limited to 
apply only where the abnormal-
ly dangerous activity "is car-
ried on by a contemporaneous 
occupier of neighboring land." 
Id at 72,642 A.2d at 186 (citing 
Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 304 
Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 
(1985)). 
After reviewing these 
limitations, the court reasoned 
that requiring the plaintiff to be 
a neighboring landowner was 
an essential tenet of the doc-
trine which should remain in-
tact. In so doing, the court 
noted extension of the doctrine 
would be inconsistent with the 
Restatement, which requires 
harm to property of another, 
where here the harm was to the 
owner's own land. Rosenblatt, 
335 Md. at 75,642 A.2d at 188. 
Furthermore, the court stated 
that a subsequent occupier of 
the same property is able to 
avoid harm completely by ade-
quately inspecting the property 
prior to purchasing or leasing it. 
Id at 74, 642 A.2d at 188. The 
court also noted that the com-
mon law rule of caveat emptor 
still applies in Maryland to the 
sale of commercial property. Id 
at 75 n.7, 642 A.2d at 188 n.7. 
Additionally, Rosenblatt's 
complaint claimed only econom-
ic losses. The principles of strict 
liability, in contrast, afford pro-
tection only to injuries to the 
person or property, "notto eco-
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nomic losses resulting from 
failed business opportunities." 
Id at 75, 642 A.2d at 188. 
Therefore, the court refused to 
expand the doctrine of strict 
liability to reach a claim for eco-
nomic loss by a subsequent oc-
cupier of commercial property 
against a prior tenant. 
Next, the court exam-
ined Rosenblatt's negligence 
claim against Exxon. In deny-
ing Rosenblatt's claim, the court 
noted that an occupier of land 
owes certain duties to both those 
who come onto the land, as well 
as occupants of neighboring land 
so as to avoid causing harm to 
the neighboring land. In con-
trast, however, an occupant of 
land owes no duty of care to 
avoid harm to his own land that 
may cause injury to a future 
occupant of the same land. Id 
at76-77,642A.2dat 189. The 
court explained that inherent in 
the concept of duty is the neces-
sity that a relationship exist be-
tween the parties, out of which 
the duty arises. Id. at 77, 642 
A.2d at 189. In determining 
that no relationship existed, the 
court reasoned that it was not 
foreseeable that "an act or fail-
ure to act by Exxon would re-
sult in harm to Rosenblatt." Id 
Fwthermore, asRosenblatt 
was aware that the property had 
previously been used as a gaso-
line station, he knew, or at least 
should have known, that petro-
leum contamination was possi-
ble.Id at 78,642 A.2d at 189. 
As such, Rosenblatt was in the 
position to have his lease be 
conditioned on a satisfactory 
completion of an environmental 
survey ofthe property. Failure 
to reasonably inspect the land 
and/or require contractual terms 
shifting the burden of risk to 
Exxon did not, in the court's 
view, impose a duty upon Exxon 
to avoid injury to subsequent 
occupiers ofland. Id Thus, the 
court affirmed summary judg-
ment on the negligence claim 
against Exxon. 
In turning to the next 
claim, the court refused to ex-
tend the tort of trespass to cir-
cumstances where the intruding 
object entered thepremisesdur-
ing the trespasser's occupancy. 
Id Implicit in the definition of 
a continuing trespass is that "the 
affected land is land of anoth-
er." Id at 78,642 A.2d at 190 
(emphasis added). According-
ly, the contamination could not 
be considered a tortious placing 
because it did not occur while 
Rosenblatt was the occupant. 
This analysis, coupled with the 
lack of any authority to support 
Rosenblatt's contention, led the 
court to reject the argument that 
petroleum contamination con-
stituted a continuing trespass 
for which a subsequent occu-
pant could recover against a 
previous occupant. 
Lastly, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland rejected 
Rosenblatt's contention that the 
law provides an action in nui-
sance to a subsequent occupant 
ofland against a previous occu-
pant. Examining section 821 D 
of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts (1965), which provides 
that a private nuisance is a 
"nontrespassory invasion of an-
other's interest in the private 
___ ._ 25.2/U.BOli~.l.f.-73 
use and enjoyment ofland," the 
court concluded that a private 
nuisance only occurs when a 
wrong is done to a neighboring 
owner, not a subsequent occu-
pier of the same property. 
Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 80, 642 
A2dat 190 (citingMeadowbrook 
Swimming Club v. Albert, 173 
Md. 641, 645, 197 A.2d 146 
(1938». In addition, the court 
noted that other jurisdictions 
which have considered the issue 
have maintained the requirement 
that the land in question be that 
of a neighbor's. Rosenblatt, 
74 - u. 
335 Md. at,80, 642 A.2dat 190. 
As such, the court affirmed 
Exxon's summary judgment on 
the nuisance issue as well. 
As a result of Thomas 
Rosenblatt being a neighbor in 
time with the Exxon company, 
rather than a neighbor in space, 
the law offered him no redress 
for the petroleum contamina-
tion of his property. In 
Rosenblatt v. Exxon, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland denied 
an occupier of commercial land 
any recompense under strict li-
ability, negligence, trespass, or 
nuisance causes of actions. In 
so ruling, the court effectively 
absolves previous occupiers of 
land of liability for the damage 
they inflict to the land during 
their occupancy. Nonetheless, 
environmental catastrophes of-
ten go undetected for extended 
periods oftime. Rosenblatt sig-
nifies the increasing probability 
over time that a subsequent oc-
cupier will bear the economic 
burden of another's neglect. 
- Garret P. Glennon Jr. 
